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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides evidence on ownership structures and corporate diversification by 
analysing 355 public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. The majority of the 
companies in the sample have an ultimate controlling owner, particularly an individual 
or family.  As controlling owners have on average, rights of control over a greater 
percentage of shares in any given company than their rights to participate in the cash 
flows from that company, controlling owners may have an incentive to expropriate 
minority interests through methods such as inefficient corporate diversification. The risk 
of such expropriation would be expected to be reflected in the value of highly diversified 
companies.  The results of the research provide no evidence to support the argument that 
diversification reduces the value of companies.  However, the finding is consistent with 
the argument that high control rights of controlling owner might encourage 
expropriation of minority interests through corporate diversification strategies. Thus, 
corporate diversification in Malaysia is perceived as a mixed blessing strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate ownership in East Asian countries, including Malaysia, is concentrated 
in the hands of large owners or controlling owners. The controlling owners are in 
a position to influence managers in determining corporate strategies. This may 
lead to unfair situations to minority owners when corporate activities are 
designed to maximize the utility of the controlling owners rather than the wealth 
of all owners. Owners' rights provide incentives that affect decision-making in 
the corporation. Owners' rights to exercise voting control over shares (control 
rights) may diverge significantly from owners' rights to participate in dividends 
and other distributions (cash flow rights), as a consequence of pyramid and cross 
shareholding. This may allow owners of public corporations in East Asia to gain 
effective control with a minimum amount of cash investment (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan & Lang, 1999c). Owners may thus have incentives to expropriate 
the wealth of minority shareholders through policies such as diversification, 
especially since protection of minority shareholders is weak in East Asian 
countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000).   
 
Previous empirical studies have discovered that diversification is a value-
decreasing strategy (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & 
Jarrell, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1997; Anderson, Bates, 
Bizjak & Lemmon, 2000; Claessens et al., 1999c; Lins & Servaes, 2002). 
However, the value of corporate diversification is related to the institutions of a 
country (Lins & Servaes, 1999; Fauver, Houston & Naranjo, 2003). Some argue 
that in a country whose external capital markets are underdeveloped, corporate 
diversification could give beneficial effects through the internal capital market 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Fauver et al., 2003). Others believe that through 
corporate diversification, the expropriation of shareholders' interests could be to 
the benefit of the managers and controlling owners (Claessens et al., 1999c; Lins 
& Servaes, 2002). We should not expect study of Malaysia alone necessarily to 
give the same results as previous studies. 
 
Malaysia has different capital market integration, legal system, economic 
development and country credit risk ranking compared with the other East Asian 
countries (Fauver et al., 2003). The Asian financial crisis has stimulated the 
Malaysian authorities more rapidly, compared to other authorities in the region, 
to reform and restructure corporations by strengthening corporate governance 
(IMF Staff Country Report, 1999). In relation to corporate diversification, 
corporations in Malaysia were found expanded and diversified extensively 
(Fatimah, 2001; Ayoib, Zuaini & Nor Aziah, 2003; Claessens, Djankov, Fan & 
Lang, 2001; Lins & Servaes, 2002). However, research on corporate 
diversification with reference to corporate ownership structure in Malaysia is still 
lacking.  
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This paper analyses the ultimate ownership structure of Malaysian 
companies and provides additional evidence showing that the majority of the 
Malaysian companies have an ultimate controlling owner. This study examines 
the levels of diversification for different categories of direct shareholding blocks, 
types of ultimate controlling owners and group affiliation of corporations. The 
study also provides evidence on the relationship between excess value and 
diversification, control rights, deviation of control rights from cash flow rights, 
and group affiliation. The findings show that, in general, diversification increases 
the value attributed to corporations. However, the existence of high levels of 
control rights is also associated with diversification, suggesting that controlling 
owners may have a tendency to expropriate minority interests through choosing 
diversification strategies that may benefit the controlling owners more than 
shareholders in general. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, 
the theoretical basis for the research is discussed, by reference to agency theory 
and the theory of corporate ownership. In this section, we also review the 
literature on corporate diversification, discussing in particular the relationships 
between diversification strategy and corporate ownership. In the third section, we 
review the data used in the research involved in tracing ultimate ownership and 
corporate diversification of Malaysian corporations. The final section contains a 
discussion and analysis of our results, leading to a brief conclusion. 
 
 
OWNERSHIP AND DIVERSIFICATION 
 
Agency Theory 
 
From a financial economist's perspective, corporate governance deals with 
agency problem that arises from the conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders (Hart, 1995). Shareholders are concerned to maximize the market 
value of their shareholding and they would prefer strategies that lead to 
maximizing the long run profitability of the corporation. Since shareholders 
could invest in a diversified portfolio at low cost, they are prepared to hold high 
risk or high return stocks to eliminate unsystematic risks and to switch out of a 
corporation when the performance of the corporation starts to decline. Managers 
are more concerned with their own wealth. They are risk averse since they cannot 
easily switch out, and they have to bear the consequences of failures in 
performance. Therefore, shareholders may prefer less corporate diversification 
because they have nothing to gain from expensive diversification (Hill & Snell, 
1988) and managers may prefer corporate diversification to increase the size of 
the corporation and to reduce their employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
Having argued that diversification reflects the risk preferences of managers 
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(Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch, 1998), which may be costly to shareholders, the 
presence of governance structures is expected to mitigate the problem.  
 
The majority of research into corporate governance that uses an agency 
theory perspective has been undertaken in countries where corporations have a 
widely dispersed ownership. However, more recent research has pointed out that 
ownership is not always dispersed. This is especially the case in East Asian 
countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta et al., 2000; 
Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 1999a, 2000). As shown in Figures 1 and 2, 
different parties are involved in agency conflicts within dispersed and 
concentrated ownership corporations. Dispersed ownership corporations have a 
large number of owners, with no dominant owner or single owner holding 
enough shares to enable that owner to control the corporation.  The control of 
day-to-day decisions is transferred to professional managers (Berle & Means, 
1932) whose interests may not coincide with those of the owners. Therefore, the 
agency problems here are the conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
 
 
SHAREHOLDERS 
PRINCIPAL 
AGENT 
MANAGERS 
 
Figure 1. Agency relationship between shareholders and managers (in 
dispersed ownership corporations) 
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SHAREHOLDERS
Outside/
Minority
MANAGERS
PRINCIPAL
AGENT
Large
Controlling
 
Figure 2.  Agency relationship between controlling shareholder/manager 
and outside shareholders (in large concentrated ownership 
corporations) 
 
Meanwhile, in concentrated ownership corporations, the existence of an 
owner of a large block or owners of several large blocks is common, and 
ownership is highly concentrated. Hence, large owners tend to be controlling 
owners who normally have the opportunity to control the management. 
Controlling owners are in the position to influence and control managers in 
making decisions through either their voting rights or their representation in 
management or on the board. Hence, the managers are likely to focus on 
controlling owners' interests rather than maximizing value for outside 
shareholders. Therefore, managers are acting for controlling owners rather than 
for shareholders in general.  However,  since  controlling  owners  do  not  receive 
100% of gains, given the presence of outside minority shareholders, an agency 
problem might occur (Hart, 1995). In this situation, agency conflicts are not only 
between managers and shareholders but also between the managers and 
controlling shareholders on one side and outside or minority shareholders on the 
other (Fan & Wong, 2002). Thus, the agency conflict arises when the manager 
neglects minority shareholders' interests.  
 
Ownership Structures 
 
The literature on the agency problem mostly focuses on the agent-principal 
relationships between managers and shareholders that prevail in the United States 
(US) and the United Kingdom (UK), where shareholder ownership is dispersed 
and shareholders have little direct control over management. Corporate 
ownership outside the US has long been considered as not dispersed (La Porta         
et al., 1999). Large or controlling shareholders are particularly common for East 
Asian corporations. Evidence in East Asian corporations suggests that 
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expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders takes place 
(Claessens et al., 1999b). Expropriation of minority shareholders refers to the 
extraction of private benefits of control by large owners that are not shared by 
minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The business could be 
structured to serve controlling shareholders' interests (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Therefore, high concentration of ownership gives rise to the agency problem 
when the controlling owner can extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Unless minority protection law is effective, the absence of 
monitoring of controlling shareholders might lead such shareholders to take 
actions that are inconsistent with outside shareholders' interests. Several 
researchers report effects of the agency problem associated with concentrated 
ownership structures in East Asian corporations. For example, the empirical 
studies show diminished firm value (Claessens et al., 2001), severe exchange rate 
depreciation and stock market declines (Johnson, Boone, Breach & Friedman, 
2000), the need to employ auditors from Big 5 corporations (who are perceived to 
have high reputations) to play a monitoring and bonding roles (Fan & Wong, 
2005), low corporate performance measured by Tobin's Q (Lemmon & Lins, 
2001) and low dividend rates (Facio, Lang & Young, 2001). 
 
Ultimate Owner 
 
Fan and Wong (2002) categorize three types of property rights arising from 
ownership in public corporations: right to deploy corporate assets (control or 
voting right); right to receive income (cash flow right); and right to transfer 
shares to another shareholders (transfer both control and cash flow right). In most 
countries outside the US and UK, owners enhance their control of corporations 
through pyramid and cross-shareholding ownership structures (La Porta et al., 
1999). In pyramid structures, a corporation is owned indirectly through other 
corporations. In a cross-shareholding ownership structure, shares in a company 
are held through several chains that link the owner to the company. These 
ownership structures create differences between the control exercisable by the 
ultimate controlling owner (voting/control rights) and that owner's entitlement to 
share in the company's profits (cash flow rights). The divergence in control rights 
and cash flow rights of an ultimate controlling shareholder gives incentives to the 
ultimate controlling shareholder to be involved in expropriation, and at the same 
time makes such expropriation easier to achieve (Claessens et al., 1999b; 
Claessens et al., 1999c; Fan & Wong, 2002). When control rights are 
significantly larger than cash flow rights, a controlling shareholder can 
expropriate minority shareholders because the controlling shareholder is able to 
control the corporation. At the same time, the controlling owner has an incentive 
to expropriate minority shareholders in order to increase economic benefits that 
flow to the owner, over and above the owner's entitlement from a relatively small 
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fraction of the equity claim on the corporate cash flows (Bebchuk, Kraakman & 
Triantis, 1999). 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) provide a pioneer contribution through their 
investigation of the chain of ownership structures to identify ultimate owners of 
corporations from the 27 richest countries. Using a 20% cut-off point to define 
control, La Porta et al. find that 64% of corporations in their sample have a 
controlling shareholder. Their findings show that family-controlled corporations 
represent 30% of the sample, state-controlled corporations represent 19% and 
other categories account for the remaining 15%. Typically, through pyramid 
ownership structures and involvement in management, the controlling 
shareholder has control rights significantly in excess of cash flow rights. 
 
Following the method of La Porta et al. (1999) for investigating ultimate 
control, Claessens et al. (1999a, 1999b, 2000) investigate ownership structures in 
nine East Asian countries, including Malaysia. They found that ultimate 
controlling shareholders are common for corporations in East Asia. Claessens         
et al. (2000) identify two-thirds of the corporations as being controlled by a 
single ultimate shareholder (one who controls over half of the votes). More than 
half of the East Asian corporations identified in Claessens et al. (1999a, 2000) are 
controlled by large families. Both studies found that smaller and older 
corporations are more likely to be family-controlled corporations. Significant 
corporate assets are in the hands of a few families (Claessens et al., 2000).  
Claessens et al. (1999b, 2000) find divergence in voting rights and cash flow 
rights of ultimate controlling shareholders, where voting rights frequently exceed 
cash flow rights. Consistent with the theoretical framework of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Claessens et al. (1999b) find that a higher concentration of 
cash-flow rights is associated with a higher market valuation. For concentration 
of control rights, their data show that control by families is negatively associated 
with market valuation. Furthermore, regressing the excess value on control and 
cash flow rights, they also find that higher cash flow rights are positively related 
to excess value. Meanwhile, the results show a negative relationship between 
degrees of control rights by the largest controlling shareholder and excess value. 
These results suggest that concentration of cash flow rights is beneficial for 
market valuation and concentration of control rights leads to expropriation of 
minority shareholders. Family control is the major predictor of expropriation of 
minority shareholders. 
 
Corporate Diversification 
 
Extensive corporate diversification in Malaysia has been established by 
researchers such as Ayoib et al. (2003), who found about 53% of the companies 
in their sample reporting multiple segments in 1995, implying that they were 
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involved in several industries. Claessens et al. (2001) investigated corporate 
diversification in the US, Japan and eight other East Asian countries (including 
Malaysia) for the period of 1990–1996. Malaysia had a high percentage (70%) of 
multisegment firm-years, while the US had the lowest percentage (20%) of 
multisegment firm-years. The decision to diversify may have been influenced by 
the risk preferences of managers, which may be expected to differ from those of 
outside shareholders.  
 
Corporations may decide to diversify for profit motive (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Hall & Lee, 1999; Amit, Livnat & Zarowin, 1989; 
Montgomery, 1994). However, financial economists in 1990s started to query the 
effect of diversifications as value increasing strategies, and they continue to 
provide empirical studies that diversification is generally a value decreasing 
strategy. The findings of most of the studies done in the US (Kaplan & Weisbach, 
1992; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; 
Servaes, 1996; Denis et al., 1997; Anderson et al., 2000) tend to support agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which predicts a negative relationship 
between corporate diversification and corporate value (Amihud & Lev, 1981; 
Denis et al., 1997). These researchers conclude that the costs of corporate 
diversification outweigh the benefits to shareholders. Diversification is 
increasingly regarded as managerially motivated in which the managers diversify 
to benefit their own interests at the expense of corporate owners (Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1990). Corporate diversification may be a way for managers to reduce their 
employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Furthermore, corporate diversification 
may provide other private benefits to managers. For example, diversification 
might benefit managers through the power and prestige associated with managing 
a larger corporation (Jensen, 1986); managerial compensation might be positively 
related to corporate size (Jensen & Murphy, 1990); and knowledge of the 
complexities associated with diversification may make managers indispensable to 
the corporation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Thus, managers have an incentive to 
reinvest free cash rather than pay it out as dividends to shareholders (Jensen, 
1986). 
 
Controlling shareholders are involved in management and their interests 
in corporate diversification are seemed similar to those of managers. Controlling 
shareholders are less likely to hold well-diversified portfolios, as their ownership 
is concentrated in the corporation. They thus have to bear large amount of risks. 
Controlling owners would see corporate diversification as a way of reducing their 
risks. This is consistent to the finding of Amihud and Lev (1981) that managers 
with more ownership choose more diversified acquisitions to reduce their risks. 
 
Results of empirical studies of diversification done outside the US are 
mixed. Lins and Servaes (1999) found that corporate diversification by listed 
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companies in Germany had no significant effect on corporate value at the end of 
1992 and 1994. However, they found diversification discounts of approximately 
10% and 15% respectively for Japanese and UK corporations. Examining a 
sample of Singaporean companies, Chen and Ho (2000) found negative 
correlation between Tobin's Q and level of diversification for 1995 data. Other 
studies suggest that diversification may be more valuable in emerging markets 
than developed market because of market imperfections. Claessens et al. (1999c) 
studied nine East Asian countries for the period of 1991–1996 (pooling data for 
Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Philippines, 
Taiwan and Thailand). They found that corporate diversification is associated 
with a 5% discount of corporate value (using Berger and Ofek's excess value) for 
the period of 1991–1996. In a different study, Lins and Servaes (2002) used 
pooled data from seven Asian countries (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand). They found that diversified corporations 
traded at a discount of 7% compared to single segment corporations in 1995. 
They noted that this is a lower discount than the ones found in studies of US 
corporations, and interpreted this lower discount as evidence that the benefits of 
diversification in emerging markets exceeded those in developed countries.  
 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) pointed out that differences in the structure of 
capital, product and labour markets, contract enforcement mechanisms and 
business-government relations in East Asia may lead to different diversification 
strategies. Fauver et al. (2003) studied 35 countries over the period of 1991–1995 
and found that the institutional environment of a country has an effect on the 
value of diversification. Countries with less developed and segmented capital 
markets exhibited either a significant diversification premium or no discount. It 
appears that benefits of diversification offset agency costs in these countries. 
They also found a smaller diversification discount in countries whose legal 
system is not English in origin. In their comparative study, Hall and Lee (1999) 
used accounting and market-based performance measures to investigate 
manufacturing corporations listed in the US and Korea in the period of 1987–
1991. They found opposite relationships between diversification and performance 
for US and Korean corporations where diversification is negatively correlated 
with performance in the US but positively correlated in Korea. Their 
interpretation is that Korean corporations do not seem to experience negative 
agency effects of diversification in the way that US corporations do.  
 
The evidence also suggested that diversified business groups are 
prevalent in emerging markets (Claessens et al., 1999c; Lins & Servaes, 2002; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Both Claessens et al. (1999c), and Lins and Servaes 
(2002) find that group-affiliated corporations are more likely to diversify than 
independent corporations in East Asian countries. However, for Malaysian 
corporations, the studies found that diversified and focused corporations are 
93 
Zuani Ishak and Christopher Napier 
equally likely to be group-affiliated. Both studies found that the diversification 
discount is more substantial in group-affiliated corporations and suggested that 
diversification is associated with poorer performance for group-affiliated 
corporations than for individual corporations. This is consistent with the 
argument that group structures allow for expropriation of minority interests by 
controlling owners. Claessens et al. (1999c) found that group-affiliated 
corporations are more likely to diversify in less developed economies than in 
more developed economies. Diversification destroys more of the value of group-
affiliated companies in more developed economies. However, in less developed 
economies, diversification appears more beneficial for group-affiliated 
companies than for individual companies. 
 
Ayoib et al. (2003) examined 219 Malaysian companies for 1995 data 
and found that direct blockholding is negatively associated with diversification 
levels. Managerial direct ownership does not have a significant effect on 
diversification levels. The researchers used reported segments to measure the 
level of diversification. Results of Chen and Ho (2000) on Singaporean 
corporations are similar to those of Ayoib et al. (2003). In terms of the valuation 
consequences of diversification, they found that value is lost in low managerial 
ownership corporations and that there is no impact from outside blockholders. 
They also support agency theory when they interpret their finding that multiple 
segment corporations are valued less in the context of low managerial ownership. 
Further, the explanation given for their result that outside blockholders do not 
have a significant impact on the value of diversification is that the disciplinary 
role of outside ownership may not be obvious in Singapore corporations since 
they have a high concentration of ownership. Considering the high concentration 
of ownership in East Asian countries, Claessens et al. (1999c) examined whether 
corporate diversification is influenced by ownership structures. Due to use of 
pyramid and crossholding structures, ultimate controlling owners are predicted to 
have influence over corporate activities. Their findings supported the view that 
ultimate controlling owners have an incentive to use diversification to expropriate 
minority shareholders when there is divergence in control rights and cash flow 
rights of ultimate controlling owners.   
 
The literature suggests that managers have an incentive to use 
diversification to reduce their risk and enhance their rewards. This may not be 
consistent with investors' preferences, as investors may be able to obtain optimal 
diversification through capital markets. Hence, diversification may be value-
reducing. However, the existence of corporate governance mechanisms such as 
large blockholders may constrain managerial behaviour. However, the presence 
of large blockholders may be a mixed blessing. Not only are such investors likely 
to be represented among management, but they may have less access to 
diversification through the capital market and thus their interest in firm-level 
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diversification aligns with management. Moreover, where large blockholders 
control corporations through complex ownership structures, but are entitled to 
relatively less of the corporations' cash flows, they have an incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders. So, the presence of large blockholders may 
not deter diversification that is not in the interests of investors in general, and the 
possibility of expropriation may reduce the value of highly diversified 
companies. We thus need to further examine the relations between corporate 
ownership structures in East Asian countries, including Malaysia, and the level 
and impact on corporate value of diversification. The present study therefore 
gathers data on ultimate corporate ownership of Malaysian listed companies, and 
examines the relationship between controlling owners' control and cash flow 
rights as well as the level and impact on value of diversification. 
 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 
The sampling frame for this study consists of non-financial public listed 
companies (PLCs) of Bursa Malaysia at the end of 2000.  Financial institutions 
were excluded because they are subjected to a regulatory framework that does not 
apply to other listed companies. In addition, several companies were excluded 
due to insufficient data on ownership were managed under Special Administrator, 
changed accounting year-end in 2001, SIC codes cannot be assigned and primary 
segment is in financial activities – [SIC codes 6000–6999]. These exclusions left 
a total of 355 companies in the data set. 
 
The data for the study were hand-collected from secondary sources, 
primarily from companies' annual reports. Apart from annual reports, other 
sources used were Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Annual Handbook, 
KLSE-RIAM Information System (KLSE-RIS) website, Hydra Net database, 
Worldscope database and the database of the Commission of Companies 
Malaysia (CCM). To enhance data accuracy, data collected from one source was 
verified by reference to other sources whenever this was possible.  
 
Diversification Data   
 
Following other studies (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & 
Jarrell 1995; Denis et al., 1997) including studies of East Asian countries (for 
example, Claessens et al., 1999c, 2000; Lins & Servaes, 2002; Fauver et al., 
2003; Feris et al., 2003), this study employed industry segments as disclosed in 
companies' annual reports to measure diversification. In defining segments, 
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Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)1 is used (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & 
Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell 1995; Denis et al., 1997) because of its objective 
approach (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). In addition, using SIC codes is 
consistent with the definition of diversification in terms of the range of lines of 
activity.   
 
The number of segments reported and the segment revenue for every 
company in the sample were collected from the segmental report contained in the 
companies' annual reports. Unlike the US data, the industry classification for 
Malaysian PLCs is not ready-made. So, to define diversification using SIC codes, 
each segment had to be assigned SIC codes manually. The four-digit SIC codes 
available in the Worldscope database were found very useful in doing this task. 
Other studies also use this database to obtain an SIC code for the segments 
reported (Claessens et al., 1999c, 2000; Lins & Sarveas, 2002; Fauver et al., 
2003). 
 
We classify corporations as "diversified" or "focused" depending on the 
number of related segments based on two-digit SIC codes. A diversified 
corporation is one with more than a single segment and where the sales in the 
primary segment are less than 90% of total sales. A focused corporation is one 
where 90% or more of sales come from one segment (Claessens et al., 1998, 
2000; Lins & Servaes, 2002; Fauver et al., 2003).    
 
 Four proxies are used for diversification levels (following Lang & Stulz, 
1994; Denis et al., 1997): 
 
i. the number of segments reported, 
ii. the number of related segments (two-digit SIC codes), 
iii. the Herfindahl index constructed from sales, and 
iv. the Herfindahl index constructed from assets.   
 
The Herfindahl indices are calculated as follows for each company i: 
 
H salesi = ∑(Sales per segment/Total sales)2 
H assetsi = ∑(Asset per segment/Total assets)2 
 
The higher the number of segments reported and the number of related segments 
(two-digit SIC codes), the higher the level of diversification. The Herfindahl 
indices range from 0 to 1. The closer a Herfindahl index is to one, the more 
                                                 
1  The SIC codes were originally established by the US Bureau of the Budget in the 1930s to 
facilitate the collection and interpretation of business data (Schachner, 1967). The SIC has 
recently been replaced by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). 
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company's sales or assets are concentrated within a few of its segments. Thus, as 
the index falls, the level of diversification increases. 
 
Excess Value 
 
The performance of diversified companies is measured by natural logarithm of 
excess value. The excess value is measured using the approach developed by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and adjusted by Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002); 
Claessens et al. (1998, 1999b, 2001) and Fauver et al. (2003). The excess value 
for a corporation is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
corporation's actual value to its imputed value. Actual value is measured as the 
corporation's total capital, that is, book value of debt plus market capitalization 
(market value of equity). Imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of the 
company's segments (Berger & Ofek, 1995). The value imputed to each segment 
is determined by multiplying the sales allocated to that segment by the segment's 
industry median capital-to-sales ratio. The industry median capital-to-sales ratio 
is constructed using single-segment corporations. This study uses at least three 
single-segment companies in calculating industry median capital-to-sales ratio 
(Claessens et al., 2001)2. In cases where diversified firms have segments for 
which insufficient single-segment corporations are available, median market 
capital-to-sales ratios were determined using broad industry classification, 
following Campbell (1996) (Lins & Servaes, 1999)3. Extreme cases of excess 
value were eliminated, following Berger and Ofek (1995). These cases were 
defined as those where the actual value was four times as large or small as the 
imputed value (Lins & Servaes, 1999; Feris et al., 2003), that is, the excess value 
took a value of above 1.386 or below –1.386. 
 
Ownership Data 
 
Claessens et al. (2000) and a few other studies (Fan & Wong, 2002; Johnson          
et al., 2000; Lemmon & Lins, 2001; Lins, 2003) have undertaken studies on 
ownership that include some Malaysian corporations in their pooled samples. The 
studies find that corporate ownership structures in Malaysia are associated with 
indirect/ultimate ownership. Therefore, data on direct ownership of Malaysian 
corporations is insufficient for determining control. For that reason, this study 
focuses on ultimate ownership. We followed La Porta et al. (1999) with 
                                                 
2  The number of single-segment companies used in determining industry median capital-to-sales 
ratio is between 3 to 15 companies. 
3 Campbell (1996) groups SIC codes into several industries (petroleum, financial/real estate, 
consumer durables, basic industry, food/tobacco, construction, capital goods, transportation, 
utilities, textiles/trade, services and leisure). For example codes 15, 16, 17, 32 and 52 are 
grouped together as "construction industry".  
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adjustments to reflect the specific situation in Malaysia and the data that are 
available. Further, we examine all owners that own at least 5% of the votes. This 
is a smaller percentage than La Porta et al. (1999), who use a 10% of voting 
rights. In addition, unlike Fan and Wong (2002) and Claessens et al. (1999a, 
1999c, 2000) who limit their attention to the owners who constitute 50% of the 
direct voting rights, we provide more details by including all block owners (those 
who own at least 5% of a company's shares). Previous studies may underestimate 
the percentage of shares controlled by large shareholders and by an ultimate 
controlling shareholder – our approach should give more reliable estimates. 
 
Claessens et al. (2000) identify ultimate owners using sources of business 
group information. However, we took more comprehensive steps to trace the 
corporate ultimate owners. The steps are shown in Figure 3. The process started 
with the list of 30 largest direct shareholders of each of the listed companies, 
which was found from the annual reports of the companies. We collected the 
names of the shareholders and the percentage of shares owned by them. Only 
blockholders (major shareholders) who owned more than 5% of equity were 
analysed. Since each account in the list of 30 largest shareholders was disclosed 
separately, the percentage of shares from different accounts, including non-block 
accounts (less than 5%) that belonged to the same blockholder, was aggregated.   
 
 
 
List the 30 largest shareholders (direct ownership) 
Identify "blockholders" (owners of 5% or more of equity) 
Categorize blockholders as institution, state, financial institution. 
Foreign company, individual/family or corporation 
If the blockholder is a corporation, trace owners (blockholders 
only) of the blockholder
Repeat the process until ultimate owners are identified 
Figure 3. Steps taken to trace ultimate owners 
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The direct blockholders (holding at least 5% of the shares) are 
categorized into institution, state, financial institution, foreign company, 
individual/family and corporation. Institutional shareholders include insurance 
companies, pension funds and professional fund managers who hold shares on 
behalf of individuals. A shareholder is categorized as State if it is a statutory 
body established at federal or state level, for example, Urban Development 
Authority (UDA), Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA), 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), Tourist Development 
Corporation (TDC), Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) and the various State 
Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). 
Companies are also categorized as state-controlled if they are owned by the 
government through Ministry of Finance. This includes companies owned by 
entities such as Khazanah Nasional Bhd., 100% owned by Ministry of Finance. 
Financial institutions are licensed banking institutions under the Central Bank of 
Malaysia.  They include commercial banks, Islamic banks, finance companies, 
merchant banks and development finance institutions. La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000) do not separately identify the financial institution 
category, but include such companies within their "institution" category. Foreign 
companies include companies incorporated outside Malaysia but with a place of 
business or business activity within Malaysia, which are registered with the 
CCM. If the owner was a company, then the owners of the company were traced 
further using online records of the company kept by the CCM. The owners of the 
company and their owners and so on were identified in order to trace the ultimate 
owner. At all levels, we collected data only for owners with shareholdings of 5% 
or more.   
 
We define a controlling shareholder as a shareholder with the ability to 
exercise significant control rights through votes. We measure control rights at 
20% cut-off point, as La Porta et al. (1999) consider 20% of voting rights as 
enough to give effective control of a company. Based on the cut-off point, 
corporations are first divided into widely-held or ultimate-owned corporations. 
Then, the ultimate owners of ultimate-owned corporations are further 
distinguished into institution, state, finance institution, foreign company, 
individual/family and widely-held corporation.  As defined in La Porta et al. 
(1999), a widely-held corporation is a corporation with no controlling owner. On 
the other hand, an ultimate-owned corporation has a controlling owner. A 
controlling owner is a shareholder owning significant control rights (exceeding 
the cut-off point) who is not controlled by anybody else (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2000).   
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The control rights of the ultimate owner are its direct and indirect voting 
rights.4  The indirect control rights are measured using the weakest link along the 
control chains connecting the ultimate owner with the corporation (Claessens     
et al., 2000). Cash flow rights are the sum of the products of the ownership stake 
along the various chains connecting a PLC to the ultimate owner (Claessens            
et al., 2000). The ratio of cash flow to control rights is measured using the 
ultimate owner's cash flow rights and control rights (Claessens et al., 2000).  
 
The data on ultimate ownership represent a more complete analysis than 
that undertaken in previous research in Malaysia and similar countries.  It allows 
a range of investigations to be undertaken into the relationship between 
ownership structures, diversification levels and the impact on corporate value of 
diversification.   
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
Diversification Data 
 
Table 1 indicates that 54.6% of the companies in 2001 were diversified and 
44.4% were focused. Claessens et al. (2001) discovered that 70% of their 
Malaysian sample companies were diversified in the period (1990–1996) before 
the Asian financial crisis. 
 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF FOCUSED AND DIVERSIFIED COMPANIES 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Focused 161 44.4 
Diversified 194 54.6 
Total 355 100.0 
 
 The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the four 
proxies used in measuring diversification are depicted in Table 2. The number of 
segments ranged from 1 to 10, with an average number of 2.36 segments. This 
result is comparable to Ayoib et al. (2003), who find 2.3 reported segments on 
average for their sample of Malaysian corporations in 1995. Denis et al. (1997), 
and Lang and Stulz (1994) report means of 2.41 and 2.54 segments for US 
corporations. For two-digit SIC segments, we find that the number of segments 
ranged from 1 to 9, with an average of 2.29 segments. The averages of 
                                                 
4  An individual has indirect control of company X, if he/she has control of company Y which in 
turn controls company X either directly or through a longer chain of ownership and control. 
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Herfindahl indices calculated based on two-digit SIC code segments are 0.71 
(sales-based) and 0.65 (assets-based) and ranged from 0.17 to 1.00 (sales-based) 
and 0.15 to 1.00 (assets-based). Ayoib et al. (2003) report Herfindahl index 
means of 0.32 (sales-based) and 0.27 (assets-based). They used Herfindahl 
indices based on reported segments that are not necessarily same as two-digit SIC 
segments; generally, the more segments that are included, the lower will be the 
value of the Herfindahl index. Denis et al. (1997), and Lang and Stulz (1994) 
both report average Herfindahl indices of 0.70 (sales-based). For the assets-based 
index, Denis et al. (1997), and Lang and Stulz (1994) have indices of 0.69 and 
0.70, respectively. 
 
TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON DIVERSIFICATION LEVELS 
 
Measurement of diversification Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Number of segments reported 2.36 2.00 1.57 1 10 
Number of related segments  
 (2-digit SIC) 
2.69 2.00 1.62 1 9 
Herfindahl index – sales 0.71 0.71 0.26 0.17 1.00 
Herfindahl index – assets 0.65 0.54 0.27 0.15 1.00 
 
Ownership Data 
 
Ownership is assessed in terms of both direct (immediate) and indirect interests.  
Direct ownership of a company is measured as the percentage of equity shares 
owned by direct owners. The mean number of direct blockholders (shareholders 
with more than 5% ownership) in the sample companies is 2.4 with 50.56% of 
shares on average owned by blockholders as a group. Table 3 shows the 
distribution of the blockholders into six ownership categories. The most 
significant category is "corporations". To identify indirect owners, the owners of 
these corporations were traced further by reference to the indirect ownership 
structure. Indirect ownership is measured by aggregating the percentage of equity 
owned both directly and indirectly by owners. Therefore, a corporation's total 
ownership could be more than 100% when measured in term of indirect 
ownership. 
 Using the indirect ownership structure, the largest controlling owners 
were identified for each company. Companies with no controlling owner are 
classified as widely-held. Other companies are classified as ultimate-owned. 
Ultimate owners were further grouped into institutional, state, financial company, 
foreign company, individual/family and widely-held corporation. Table 4 depicts 
the classification of the largest ultimate owner at a 20% cut-off point. The table 
shows that about 85% of the sample companies have an ultimate controlling 
owner at the 20% cut-off point. 
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TABLE 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DIRECT (IMMEDIATE) OWNERSHIP 
 
 Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Number of blockholders 2.44 2.00 1.25 0 7 
Shares owned by blockholders( in %)       
Institutions 5.93 0.00 11.29 0 75.72 
Individual/Family 9.93 0.00 16.58 0 67.00 
States 1.67 0.00 9.04 0 65.00 
Financial institutions 0.33 0.00 3.47 0 59.00 
Foreign corporations 6.52 0.00 18.45 0 85.00 
Corporations 26.18 24.71 23.65 0 92.12 
All blockholders 50.56 52.62 20.05 0 92.12 
 
 
TABLE 4 
CLASSIFICATION OF ULTIMATE OWNERS 
 
Cut-off point 20% 
 Frequency % 
Widely-held 52 14.6 
Ultimate-owned   
Institutional 26 7.3 
State 17 4.8 
Financial 6 1.7 
Foreign company 43 12.1 
Family/Individual 172 48.5 
Widely-held corporation 39 11.0 
Total 355 100.0 
 
Shareholders' Rights 
 
Table 5 shows the control (voting) rights and cash flow rights of the largest 
ultimate owner. The mean of cash flow rights (23.0%) is lower than the mean of 
control rights (33.1%), because of the dilutive effects of pyramid and 
crossholding ownership structures. The ratio of cash to control rights, with a 
mean of 0.71, indicates the degree of divergence between cash flow rights and 
control rights. The closer the ratio to zero, the larger is the divergence. The mean 
of control rights (33.1%) is high compared to the results obtained by Fan and 
Wong (2002) and Claessens et al. (2000), who report 30.7% and 28.3% 
respectively for Malaysian companies. As described before, these researchers 
economized on data collection by terminating the tracing of owners once the 
voting rights reached 50%. Thus, their statistics for control rights are expected to 
be lower than those reported in this study. 
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TABLE 5 
CONTROL RIGHTS, CASH FLOW RIGHTS AND RATIO OF CASH TO  
CONTROL RIGHTS OF THE LARGEST CONTROLLING OWNER 
 
 Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Control rights (%) 33.10 29.40 20.20 0.00 141.30 
Cash flow rights (%) 23.00 19.50 16.70 0.00 92.10 
Ratio of cash to control rights 0.71 0.99 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 
Diversification and Ownership 
 
We measured the mean levels of diversification using the four different 
measurement bases set out above by reference to blockholding categories, types 
of ultimate controlling owners and presence or absence of group affiliation. We 
tested whether any differences between means were statistically significant by 
using the Kruskal-Wallis test (for more than two categories) and the Mann-
Whitney test (for two categories). These non-parametric tests were chosen 
because the normality distribution and constant variance assumptions are violated 
for the diversification levels data.  The results in Table 6 show that, irrespective 
of the measurement used for level of diversification, mean diversification levels 
differ significantly according to the types of controlling owner.  Corporations 
controlled by financial institutions have the highest mean level for diversification 
(except when diversification is measured using the Herfindahl index for sales). In 
addition, 62.8% of the companies have a group affiliation (see Table 10), that is, 
they have the same controlling owner(s) as at least one other company in the 
sample or they have another PLC in the company's pyramid of ownership 
structure. As shown in Table 6, diversification levels are also higher in 
corporations without a group affiliation than in corporations with a group 
affiliation.  This is consistent with the findings of Claessens et al. (1999c), who 
noted that single-segment (undiversified) corporations in Malaysia are marginally 
more likely to have a group affiliation than multisegment (diversified) 
corporations. Claessens et al. (1999c) argue that group affiliation complements 
diversification in creating internal markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
Zuani Ishak and Christopher Napier 
TABLE 6 
MEAN LEVELS OF DIVERSIFICATION BY OWNERSHIP DATA 
 
Diversification levels 
Number of 
segments 
reported 
Number of 
related 
segments        
(2-digits SIC) 
Herfindahl 
index – sales 
Herfindahl 
 index – assets 
Categories of controlling owner 
No controlling  
 owner  
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.19 
167.45 
2.60 
174.22 
0.70 
178.34 
0.65 
178.71 
Institution 
 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.38 
178.83 
2.85 
195.42 
0.61 
140.65 
0.59 
158.44 
Financial 
 institution 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
4.17 
253.83 
4.17 
226.25 
0.63 
138.08 
0.57 
134.08 
State 
 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.35 
185.88 
2.82 
182.47 
0.70 
179.18 
0.66 
182.24 
Foreign  
 company 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
1.42 
112.40 
1.70 
110.92 
0.81 
220.79 
0.79 
228.90 
Family/ 
 individual 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.59 
192.79 
2.90 
190.30 
0.70 
173.90 
0.63 
170.09 
Widely-held  
 corporation 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.31 
183.51 
2.62 
181.78 
0.69 
174.45 
0.63 
173.77 
      
Kruskal-Wallis  
 test                      
p value 
(chi square) 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.050**   0.029** 
Group Affiliation 
Affiliation Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.22 
167.15 
2.53 
167.39 
0.72 
184.58 
0.67 
184.20 
No affiliation Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.60 
196.33 
2.94 
195.92 
0.68 
165.45 
0.61 
167.52 
      
Mann-Whitney  
 test 
p value 
(z-statistic) 
0.007*** 
(2.711)  
0.009*** 
(2.596) 
0.086** 
(–1.718) 
0.134 
(–1.498) 
***   significant at 0.01 level 
**     significant at 0.05 level 
*      significant at 0.10 level 
The shaded cells are the highest diversification levels in the particular variable. 
 
Corporate Value 
 
We used Berger and Ofek's (1995) excess value approach to assess the impact of 
diversification on corporate value. The excess value is measured by taking the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of actual to imputed value using turnover and asset 
multipliers. As extreme cases (actual values either more or less than four times 
imputed) have been excluded, the total number of companies analyzed is 285 of 
the full sample of 355 companies. Table 7 summarizes descriptive statistics for 
excess value.  
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TABLE 7 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CORPORATE EXCESS VALUE 
 
 
  N Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Excess value  
(turnover multiplier) 285 –0.09 –0.11 0.62 –1.37 1.34 
 
Table 8 reports the mean diversification level for each quartile of excess value. 
The levels of diversification for each quartile are significantly different. 
Interestingly, the highest level of diversification is found in the fourth quartile of 
excess value (the highest value category). The correlations between 
diversification levels and excess value show that excess value increases 
significantly as diversification level increases.  
 
TABLE 8 
DIVERSIFICATION AND EXCESS VALUE 
 
 
Diversification levels 
Number of 
segments 
reported 
Number of 
related 
segments 
 (2-digits SIC) 
Herfindahl 
index – sales 
Herfindahl 
 index – assets 
Panel A: Mean of diversification levels for each quartile of excess value 
1st quartile 
(–1.37 to –0.59) 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.02 
131.13 
2.50 
141.00 
0.72 
142.67 
0.65 
144.26 
2nd quartile 
(–0.58 to –0.10) 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.01 
131.57 
2.36 
131.02 
0.72 
147.74 
0.67 
146.30 
3rd quartile 
(–0.09 to 0.49) 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
2.28 
141.58 
2.47 
134.37 
0.74 
154.52 
0.69 
154.46 
4th quartile 
(0.50 to 1.34) 
Mean 
Mean Rank 
3.08 
178.44 
3.59 
181.16 
0.62 
114.98 
0.57 
115.85 
      
Kruskal-Wallis test p value 
(chi square) 
0.003*** 
(13.641) 
0.002*** 
(14.572) 
0.042** 
(8.217) 
0.055* 
(7.620) 
Panel B: Spearman correlation between diversification levels and excess value 
Excess value – turnover 0.20*** 0.15** –0.09 –0.09 
***   significant at 0.01 level 
**     significant at 0.05 level 
*       significant at 0.10 level 
The shaded cells are the highest diversification levels in the particular variable. 
 
The relationship between excess value, ownership structure and diversification is 
analyzed further using ordinary least square regression, with excess value as the 
dependent variable (Denis et al., 1997; Lins & Servaes, 1999, 2002). The 
variables used are defined in Table 9, and descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 10. The variables also include the control variables as used in previous 
studies, corporate size (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Denis et al., 
1997), leverage (Anderson et al., 2000) and corporate age (Denis et al., 1997). 
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TABLE 9 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES (MODEL 1 TO MODEL 4) 
 
Variables Definitions 
EXCESSTR 
 
 
Natural logarithm of ratio actual (book value of debt plus market 
capitalization) to imputed value (sum of segments' sales multiplied by 
industry median capital-to-sales ratio) 
DIVER Binary variable: 1 = diversified company, 0 = focused company 
DIVERSIFICATION 
(NMSEG2D) Diversification level measured as number of two-digit SIC segments 
CONTROL  Percentage of control rights held by the largest owner 
CASHCONT Ratio of cash to control rights of the largest owner 
HCONLCAS Binary variable: 1 = company with the largest owner having control 
rights above median but cash flow rights below median,   
0 = otherwise 
SINGLE Binary variable: 1 = company having single owner owned majority 
control (holding at least 50% of the total control rights of all owners),  
0 = otherwise 
GROUP Binary variable: 1 = company having same ultimate controlling owners 
with other companies in the sample or has other PLCs in ownership 
structure, 0 = otherwise 
RELATED Binary variable: 1 = company with all two-digit SIC code segments 
falling in the same Campbell's (1996) classification as primary two-
digit SIC segments 
SIZE  (LNASSET) Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEVERAGE 
(DBTASS)  Total debt-to-total asset ratio 
AGE (LISTYR) Corporate age since listed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
Expropriation and Corporate Diversification in Malaysia 
 
TABLE 10 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (N = 285) (MODEL 1 TO MODEL 4) 
 
 Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
EXCESSTR  –0.09 –0.11    0.62       –1.37 1.34 
DIVER 0.54 1.00 0.50 0 1.00 
DIVERSIFICATION 2.69 2.00 1.62    1.00 9.00 
CONTROL  34.00  30.00    20.06 0 141.30 
CASHCONT 0.72    1.00       0.33 0 1.00 
HCONLCAS 0.14 0 0.35 0 1.00 
SINGLE 0.39 0 0.49 0 1.00 
GROUP 0.62 1.00 0.49 0 1.00 
RELATED 0.39 0 0.49 0 1.00 
SIZE 19.32  18.95 1.32 17.17 24.72 
LEVERAGE   0 .28  0.28 0.35 0 3.34 
AGE 9.93    6.57 6.96 9.52 40.20 
 
 We tested four models as stated in Table 11. Model 1 tests for a 
relationship between EXCESS value and DIVER (where 1 indicates a diversified 
company), controlling for SIZE, LEVERAGE and AGE of the corporations. In 
Model 2, DIVER is changed to diversification level (DIVERSIFICATION). 
Models 3 and 4 investigate whether owners' rights and group affiliation affect 
diversification value. In Model 3, the largest owner's control rights (CONTROL) 
and the ratio of cash flow rights to control rights (CASHCONT) are tested. In 
Model 4, the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights is measured using a 
dummy variable whereby companies with the largest controlling owner having 
high control rights but low cash flow rights (HCONLCAS) are coded as one. 
Another three new dummy variables, single owner controlled (SINGLE), group 
affiliation (GROUP) and secondary segment related to primary segment 
(RELATED) are added in Model 4. LEVERAGE and AGE are not included in 
Models 3 and 4 since they are not significant in Models 1 and 2. The results of 
the regressions are reported in Table 11. 
 
 The models are all significant at p = 0.000. The adjusted R2 for the 
models are from 5% to 11%. However, since the purpose of this study is to 
examine the association between dependent and independent variables and not to 
derive a model to predict the dependent variable, the adjusted R2  is  not  relevant.    
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TABLE 11 
REGRESSION MODELS OF EXCESS VALUES ON DIVERSIFICATION  
DUMMY AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Model 1: EXCESSTR = β0 +  β1 (DIVER) + β2 (SIZE) + β3 (LEVERAGE) + β4 (AGE) + ei 
Model 2: EXCESSTR = β0 + β1 (DIVERSIFICATION) + β2 (SIZE) + β3 (LEVERAGE)  
  + β4 (AGE) + ei 
Model 3: EXCESSTR = β0 + β1 (DIVERSIFICATION) + β2 (CONTROL) + β3 
(CASH/CONTROL) + β4 (SIZE) + ei 
Model 4: EXCESSTR = β0 + β1 (DIVERSIFICATION) + β2 (RELATED) + β3 (HCONLCAS) 
+ β4 (SINGLE) + β5 (GROUP) + β6 (SIZE)  + ei 
 
The coefficient estimates from the regression (numbers in parenthesis are t statistics): 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
INTERCEPT         0*** 
(–3.84) 
       0*** 
(–3.85) 
       0*** 
(–4.35) 
       0*** 
(–4.67) 
DIVER  
 
        0.03 
(0.50) 
   
DIVERSIFICATION 
 
         0.19*** 
(3.24) 
       0.18*** 
(3.17) 
      0.21*** 
(2.75) 
CONTROL 
 
       –0.13** 
(–2.24) 
 
CASHCONT        –0.04 
(–0.72) 
 
HCONLCAS         –0.12** 
(–2.12) 
SINGLE         –0.19*** 
(3.13) 
GROUP         –0.03 
(–0.48) 
RELATED           0.04 
(0.49) 
SIZE         0.22*** 
(3.50) 
        0.20*** 
(3.22) 
        0.23*** 
(3.56) 
       0.25*** 
(4.11) 
LEVERAGE 
 
        0.03 
(0.54) 
        0.01      
(0.09) 
  
AGE 
 
        0.03 
(0.48) 
        0.02 
(0.28) 
  
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11 
N 285 285 285 285 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
**   significant at 0.05 level 
*     significant at 0.10 level  
  
standard deviation of residual value for all models are lower than the standard 
deviation of dependent variable (0.62), illustrating that there is no problem in the 
linearity of the relationships between the dependent variable and independent 
variables of the models. The Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroscedasticity show 
that this does not appear to be a problem in all models. Linktest and Ramset tests 
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show that none of the models has a specification error. The _hatsq for all models 
are not significant (p > 0.05), so Linktest has failed to reject the assumption that 
the model is specified correctly. Similarly, p > 0.05 in Ramsey tests illustrate that 
there are no omitted variables in the models. As the VIF of each independent 
variable is less than two in all models, multicollinearity is also not a problem for 
the models.  
 
 Model 1 shows that diversified corporations have excess value of more 
3% compared with focused corporations, but it is not statistically significant. In 
Model 2, when DIVER dummy is changed to DIVERSIFICATION level, the 
coefficient shows significant positive relationship with excess value. This means 
that diversification gives more value to the corporations. Diversification level is 
measured as the number of two-digit segments (Claessens et al., 1999c, 2001). 
The coefficients for SIZE, LEVERAGE and AGE are positive in both models but 
only SIZE has significant effect on excess value.   
 
The control rights of the largest ultimate owner (CONTROL) have a 
significant negative relationship with excess value (EXCESSTR) in Model 3. 
Therefore, the higher the control rights of the controlling owner, the lower the 
excess value. This supports the concern that expropriation might occur when the 
controlling owner has significant control rights (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Bukart, 
Gromb & Panunzi, 1997). The ratio of cash to control rights (CASHCONT) is 
not significant in the models, but the negative sign coefficient supports the 
argument that high divergence, where control rights are higher than cash flow 
rights, gives an incentive to controlling owners to expropriate minority interests 
because the controlling owners bear a smaller proportion of the cash effect 
(Bebchuk et al., 1999). Model 4 supports the idea that deviation of cash flow 
rights from control rights (HCONLCAS) has a significant relationship with 
excess value when the coefficient illustrates that companies with the largest 
owner having high control but low cash have excess value 12% lower than other 
companies. The results in Model 4 also show that single-owner-controlled 
companies (SINGLE) have less excess value, about 19%, compared with 
companies that are not controlled by a single owner. There is no significant 
relation between GROUP and RELATED variables with excess value tested in 
Model 4. All variables in Models 3 and 4 have estimation of positive and 
negative coefficient as expected.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous studies on the relationship between corporate ownership and the value 
of corporate diversification have included Malaysian corporations in their pooled 
samples, but do not examine the data of Malaysian corporations separately.  
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Using a sample of 355 PLCs in Malaysia (of which 55% were diversified), we 
found that the level of diversification varies significantly for different types of 
ultimate controlling owners.  In addition, companies without a group affiliation 
diversify more than companies with a group affiliation. 
 
Overall, our findings do not support the argument that diversification is a 
value-reducing strategy for Malaysian corporations. Although there is no 
statistical evidence that diversified corporations are valued differently from 
focused corporations, there is evidence that value increases when the level of 
diversification increases. This provides evidence that diversification does not 
necessarily reduce corporate value. Our finding is consistent with the work of 
Fauver et al. (2003), who suggest that the value of corporate diversification in 
different countries is related to the institutional framework in each country.  
 
Due to pyramid and crossholding structures, control rights are higher 
than cash flow rights. The regression models show that control rights of 
controlling shareholders have a significant negative relationship with excess 
value. This is consistent with the view that corporate diversification may be a 
strategy for expropriating minority interests. The ratio of cash to control rights is 
not a significant variable, although the sign of the variable is consistent with the 
expropriation strategy (the greater the divergence between control and cash flow 
rights, the more likely it is that controlling shareholders will be interested in 
expropriation).  Therefore, the evidence shows that ultimate owners' rights are 
related to diversification strategies. 
 
In this paper, we demonstrated that, in a developing country, 
diversification is perceived as a mixed blessing. Given the inter-relatedness of 
many companies, it may still be more efficient for substantial investors to achieve 
the benefits of a diversified portfolio through firm-level diversification rather 
than capital market diversification. Hence, diversification may be regarded as 
positive. On the other hand, diversification may be used by controlling 
shareholders as a strategy for extracting value from companies at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Our evidence suggests that diversification is still, in 
Malaysia, perceived to be on balance a contributor to firm value rather than value 
reducing. 
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